Proxy war involves the sponsorship of actors by an external power to influence a violent conflict’s outcome for its own strategic purposes. While some scholars have defined proxy warfare in terms of support for nonstate actors, this approach falls short of capturing the broad range of indirect activities that have long been employed by great powers during times of strategic rivalry.
One of the key factors that drives the occurrence of proxy war is the difficulty of overtly intervening in another state’s civil war, particularly when the conflict does not present an immediate threat to a sponsoring power’s national security interests. This is especially true if the conflict does not involve direct competition between the sponsoring state and its rivals in other regions.
Once the spigot of cash and weapons opens to a proxy, it is very difficult to close. As a result, sponsoring powers often build up programs and bureaucracies to sustain their proxies, creating vested interests in keeping the conflict going. In addition, if the sponsoring state wants to maintain its ability to negotiate a settlement when desired, it must be able to adjust its incentive structure to reflect changing circumstances.
Moreover, supporting a proxy often leads to other states meddling and backing their own favored factions, further complicating the conflict. As a result, proxy conflicts can become intractable and breed deep distrust among local populations toward the foreign patrons. They can also destabilize entire regions, fueling terrorism and other forms of insurgency, and lead to long-term resentment towards the sponsoring state.
About the Author
